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CLASS ACTION LITIGATION IN CHINA 
Class struggle has moved to China's courtrooms. Since the passage 
of China's I99I Civil Procedure Law (CPL),l which explicitly permits 
class action litigation,2 multiplaintiff groups have brought suits seeking 
compensation for harm caused by pollution, false advertising, contract 
violations, and securities law violations. Although administrative 
bodies continue to resolve most disputes in China,s the increasing 
prevalence of class actions is one aspect of an explosion in civil litiga-
tion over the past decade. Class action litigation has the potential to 
alter the role courts play in adjudicating disputes, increase access to 
the courts, and facilitate the independence of the legal profession. 
The undeveloped status of class action litigation in China, the pau-
city of written materials on class actions,4 the absence of statistics on 
its incidence,s and the development of class actions within a legal sys-
tem undergoing radical change impede any attempt to draw broad 
conclusions concerning the significance of class action litigation in 
1 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa [Civil Procedure Law of the People's Re-
public of China] [hereinafter CPL], I99I ZHONGHUA RENMlN GONGHEGUO FAGUI HUIBlAN 
[COLLECTED LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REpUBLIC OF CHINA] 9 [hereinafter 
F AGUI HUIBlAN]. 
2 Although formally called daibiaoren susong (representative lawsuits), many Chinese com-
mentators and press accounts use the termsjituan susong or jituanxing susong (class actions), es-
pecially when referring to suits in which the number of plaintiffs is not fixed; jituan susong is the 
term Chinese commentators use to describe class actions in the United States. See, e.g., Zhongguo 
Falil Nianjian Bianji Bu [Law Yearbook of China Editorial Department], ZHONGGUO FALO 
NIANJIAN (1996) [LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA (1996)] [hereinafter YEARBOOK (1996)] I26 (using 
the term fituanxing susong to describe group actions in China); Zhuang Shuzhen & Dong Tianfu, 
Woguo Daibiaoren Susong Zhidu Yu Meiguo Jituan Susong Zhidu De Bijiao Yanjiu [Comparative 
Research into Our Nation's Representative Suit System and America's Class Action System], I996 
FASHANG YAN]lU [LAW AND BUSINESS RESEARCH], No.2, at 77, 79 (using the term jituan 
susuong to describe class actions in the United States). This Note uses the term "class action" to 
describe suits brought pursuant to articles 54 and 55 of the CPL; the substance of articles 54 and 
55 is discussed in Part I. However, because this Note is primarily concerned with the dynamics of 
multiparty litigation, and because accounts of multiparty cases often omit procedural information, 
"class action" may be used to refer to cases not explicitly brought pursuant to articles 54 or 55. 
3 See Tian Jiyun, Jiaqiang Fazhi Jianshe Tuidong Jingji Fazhan He Shehui Quanmian Jinbu 
[Strengthen Construction of the Legal System, Promote Economic Development and Comprehen-
sive Social Progress], FAZHI RmAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAlLY], Oct. 30, I995, at I, 2 (stating that 
administrative bodies enforce more than 80% of laws and regulations); see also Anthony R Dicks, 
Compartmentalized Law and Judicial Restraint: An Inductive View of Some Jurisdictional Barri-
ers to Reform, in CHINA'S LEGAL REFORMS 82, 86 (Stanley B. Lubman ed., I996) (stating that 
"the courts in China share the responsibility for [legislative interpretation and dispute adjudica-
tion] with other 'courts' - ministries, commissions and other bodies'~. 
4 This Note relies upon interviews with Chinese academics, officials, and lawyers; on press 
accounts of multiplaintiff disputes; and on the small body of Chinese scholarship on class actions. 
Confidential interviews were conducted during the summers of I996 and I997, and in January 
I998. Interviews are identified by the year in which they were conducted and the occupation of 
the interviewee. 
S The Supreme People's Court does not keep statistics regarding the prevalence of class action 
litigation. See I997 Academic Interview A. 
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China. However, China's experience with class action legislation and 
litigation illuminates both its experimental approach to law reform and 
the evolving roles of courts, individuals, and lawyers within the Chi-
nese legal system. As China's leaders struggle to determine whether 
they can foster a law-based society without losing control, class actions 
provide a window on fundamental tensions in the Chinese legal sys-
tem: between a government policy of increasing the importance of the 
courts, in part to force local officials to obey the law, and a system still 
inhospitable to plaintiffs; between government's desire to harness a 
market-driven legal profession to further law implementation and its 
desire to continue to regulate lawyers tightly; and between government 
efforts to shape the legal system and the plurality of factors that con-
tribute to the evolution of that system. 
I. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
China has one of the few legal systems outside the United States 
that permits class actions.6 Although a number of countries have 
adopted procedures by which a representative may litigate on behalf of 
individuals with the same interests,? few countries other than the United 
States permit class actions for large or unidentified groups of plaintiffs.8 
Civil law nations have often rejected class actions because such pro-
ceedings run counter to traditional views of litigation as "a matter for 
individual enterprise,"9 unfairly bind individuals not party to an action, 
and overlook traditional distinctions between public and private.1o 
In contrast to many nations that have rejected class actions, China 
has a strong collective tradition. Disputes have often been resolved 
collectively and informally.l1 Thus, although the prevalence of class ac-
tions suggests that group disputes are increasingly being resolved 
through formal legal mechanisms,12 group dispute resolution itself is not 
6 Cj. H. Patrick Glenn, The Dilemma of Class Action Refonn, 6 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 262, 
262 (1986) (noting that "class actions have been a marginal phenomenon, limited to a single judi-
cial tradition - that of the common law"). 
7 See John G. Fleming, Mass Torts, 42 AM. J. COMPo L. 507, 523 (1994). See generally Bryant 
G. Garth, Group Actions in Civil Procedure: Class Actions, Public Actions, Parens Patriae and 
Organization Actions, in GENERAL REpORTS TO THE XillTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 205, 216-21 (International Academy of Comparative Law ed., 1990) (summa-
rizing recent developments in group actions). 
8 Cj. Fleming, supra note 7, at 520-21 (stating that only the United States, Canada, and Aus-
tralia have introduced formal class action proceedings). 
9 Richard B. Cappalli & Claudio Consolo, Class Actions for Continental Europe? A Prelimi-
nary Inquiry, 6 TEMP. INT'L & COMPo L.J. 217, 233 (1992). 
10 See id. at 223-24; Garth, supra note 7, at 207. 
11 See Lester Ross, The Changing Profile of Dispute Resolution in Rural China: The Case of 
Zouping County, Shandong, 26 STAN. J.lNT'L L. IS, IS (1990). 
12 There has been an increase in the use of a number of forms of collective action and com-
plaints in recent years. See Lianjiang Li & Kevin J. O'Brien, Villagers and Popular Resistance ill 
Contemporary China, 22 MOD. CHINA 28, 28-29 (1996); Kevin J. O'Brien & Lianjiang Li, The 
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an innovation. Additionally, Chinese courts have historically been in-
hospitable fora for adjudicating individual rights,13 and individuals 
have often been reluctant to use the COUrts.14 
China's decision to provide courts with procedures for handling 
group disputes appears to have been animated both by a willingness to 
experiment and by functional concerns regarding the ability of the judi-
ciary to handle an increasing number of multiparty disputes. China has 
repeatedly experimented in law reform by selectively adapting aspects 
of foreign legal systems. IS In the case of class actions, China appears 
to have drawn heavily on the American experience.16 China's courts 
faced an increasing number of multiparty disputes in the late 1980s, 
but lacked the procedures to handle themY The courts' difficulties 
stemmed from the complexity of cases involving large numbers of liti-
gants, and from courts' own lack of resources: many judges have little 
or no formal legal education,18 and courts are underfunded, with their 
finances often controlled by the local government.19 
Despite the lack of formal procedures, some Chinese courts adjudi-
cating multiparty disputes prior to 1991 used procedures resembling 
those later included in the CPL.20 In 1985, for example, when 1569 
Politics of Lodging Complaints in Rural China, CHINA Q., Sept. 1995, at 756, 756-57, 760-61, 
767. 
13 See Ross, supra note II, at 16-17. 
14 See ALBERT HUNG-YEE CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE 
PEOPLE'S REpUBUC OF CHINA 168 (1992); see also WILLIAM C. JONES, THE GREAT QING CODE 
100II (1994) (noting that during the Qing Dynasty, legal proceedings "could be quite dreadful for 
everyone, including the complainant"). But see PmuP HUANG, CIvIL JUSTICE IN CHINA 10-15 
(1996) (arguing that there was a significant volume of civil litigation in Qing China). 
15 See, e.g., Shen Zongling, Dangdai Zhongguo Jiejian Waiguo Falu De Shili (Shang) [Exam-
ples of Contemporary China's Borrowing of Foreign Law (Part 1)], 1997 ZHONGGUO FAXUE 
[CHINESE LEGAL STUDIES], NO.5, at 22, 22-28 (describing examples of China borrowing legal 
concepts from abroad). 
16 One Chinese academic stated that Chinese academic writing on class actions in the late 
19805, which drew heavily from American experience, played a role in spurring the adoption of 
class action procedures in the CPL. See 1998 Academic Interview A. However, China apparently 
modeled CPL article 54 on Japanese law. See Jiang Wei & Xiao Jianguo, Guanyu Daibiaoren 
Susong De Jige Wenti [Some Issues Regarding Representative Litigation], 1994 FAXUEJIA 
UURISTS' REVIEW], NO.3, at 3, 3-4· 
17 See Jiang Wei & Jia Changcun, Lun Jituan Susong (Xia) [A Discussion of Class Action Liti-
gation (Part II)], 1989 ZHONG GUO FAXUE [CHINESE LEGAL STUDIES], No. I, at 103, 110; see 
also ZHONG GUO MINSHI SUSONG FA [CHINA'S CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW] 103 (Zhang Jinhong ed., 
1996) (stating that the need for class actions stemmed from an increase in suits involving large 
numbers of people and from concerns over the economics of such suits). 
18 See CHEN, supra note 14, at 122; Donald C. Clarke, Power and Politics in the Chinese 
Court System: The Enforcemen't of Civil Judgments, 10 COLUM. J. AsIAN L. I, 10 (1996). 
19 See CHEN, supra note 14, at 123. 
20 See Jiang & Jia, supra note 17, at nO-II; Wang Hongyan, Shilun Tuixtlan Daibiaoren 
Zhidu [An Examination of the System of Selecting Representatives], 1989 FAXUE LUNCONG 
[COLLECTED ESSAYS ON LEGAL STUDIES], No.2, at 34, reprinted in 1989 FUYIN BAOKAN 
ZILIAO FAXUE YUEKAN [REPRODUCED MATERIALS FROM NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS 
LAW MONTHLY], No. 12, at 144,144-45. 
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Sichuan farmers filed suit to enforce a seed contract, the court permit-
ted them to select representatives to carry out the litigation.21 In addi-
tion, the Supreme People's Court (SPC) and the State Council, China's 
chief executive and administrative body, authorized the use of class ac-
tion procedures in at least three contexts.22 
China's I99I Civil Procedure Law separates class action litigation 
into two categories: cases in which the number of litigants is fixed, and 
cases in which the number is not known at the time the case is filed. 
Article 54 governs cases in which the number of litigants is fixed, and 
provides that in joint litigation23 in which the number of parties on ei-
ther side of the litigation is "large," such parties may choose one or 
more representatives to carry out the litigation.24 The Supreme Peo-
ple's Court's official interpretation of the CPL defines "large" generally 
The 1982 Civil Procedure Law (for 'Ilial Implementation) permitted parties with common in-
terests and obligations to join their actions, but did not explicitly provide for the use of class rep-
resentatives. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa (Shixing) [people's Republic 
of China Civil Procedure Law (for 'Ilial Implementation)) [hereinafter CPL (for 'Ilial Implemen-
tation)], 1982 FAGUI HUIBIAN 133, arts. 47-48. 
21 See Jiang & Jia, supra note 17, at lIe-II; Wang, supra note 20, at 145. In other cases ill 
which the number of plaintiffs was potentially large, local authorities brought suit on behalf of 
the harmed parties. See, e.g., Chunyangcun Cunmin Weiyuanhui Su Huanan Jinkuangju Cai-
jinchuan Paiwu Wuran Shuitian Sunhai Peichang Jiufen An [The Case of the Chunyang ViIlagc 
Villagers' Committee Suing the Huanan Gold Mining Bureau in a Dispute over Compensation for 
Harm to Paddy Fields Caused by Emissions from Gold Mining Boats], 1988 ZHONGHUA 
RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZUIGAO RENMIN FAYUAN GONGBAO [GAZETTE OF THE SUPREME 
PEOPLE'S COURT OF THE PEOPLE'S REpUBLiC OF CHlNA] [hereinafter SPC GAZETTE], NO.4, at 
28, 28-29 (describing a 1987 suit brought by a village committee for damages to crops from pollu-
tion). Whether governments are permitted to bring such suits today is unclear. In one case, a lo-
cal government brought suit on behalf of residents suffering the effects of pollution. See Chen 
Tinglang, Ling Ren Kunhuo de Panjue [A Perplexing Ruling], ZHONG GUO HUANJING BAO 
[CHlNA ENVIRONMENT NEWS], July 5, 1997, at 3. Although the intermediate court that heard 
the case ordered the defendant to clean up the pollution it had caused and to pay compensation, 
the Heilongjiang Provincial High Court reversed the decision, stating that the local government 
lacked legal status to bring the case. See id. 
22 See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Nongcun Chengbao Hetong Jiufen Anjian Ruo-
gan Wenti De Yijian [Views of the Supreme People's Court Regarding Some Issues Related to the 
Judging of Village Assignment Contract Dispute Cases], 1986 SPC GAZETTE, NO.3, at 3, 7 (per-
mitting the use of representatives in cases involving large numbers of parties and stating that the 
actions of the representatives are binding on the represented parties); Zuigao Renmin Fayuan 
Guanyu Zai Shenli Jingji Hetong Jiufen Anjian Zhong Juti Shiyong Jingji Hetong Fa De Ruogan 
Wenti De Jieda [Response of the Supreme People's Court Regarding Some Questions Concerning 
the Specific Use of the Economic Contract Law in the Judging of Economic Contract Dispute 
Cases], 1987 SPC GAZETTE, NO.3, at 3, 10 (same); Guoying Qiye Laodong Zhengyi Chuli 
Zhanxing Guiding [Provisional Regulations for the Resolution of Labor Disputes in State Enter-
prises], 1987 FAGUI HUIBIAN 813, art. 4 (providing for the use of representatives in labor media-
tion and arbitration proceedings in which 10 or more workers have common claims). 
23 Article 53 defines joint litigation as litigation in which one or both sides consist of two or 
more parties, with such parties sharing either the same litigation objective or having claims of a 
similar type. See CPL, supra note I, art. 53. 
24 See id. art. 54. 
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to be ten or more persons.25 Additionally, it states that actions brought 
under articles 54 and 55 may have between two and five representa-
tives.26 
Article 55 governs cases in which the number of plaintiffs or de-
fendants is not flxed. It provides that in cases in which many parties 
have similar claims, but the actual number of parties is not known at 
the time the case is flIed, the court may issue a notice detailing the 
substance of the case and instructing all persons whose rights are 
similarly affected to register with the court within a specifled period.27 
The parties who register then may select one or more representatives.28 
Both articles 54 and 55 provide that the actions of the representa-
tives are binding on the represented parties.29 However, the repre-
sented parties must consent to a change in the representative or to any 
decision by the representative to abandon the litigation, accept a de-
mand of the opposing party, or settle the case.30 Article 55 also pro-
vides that the court's decision is binding on all those who register with 
the court, and on those with similar interests who do not register but 
who bring suit within the prescribed litigation period.31 
Aside from the few references to articles 54 and 55 in the SPC's in-
terpretation, courts have received little guidance in handling class ac-
tions.32 Courts thus appear free to continue to experiment with class 
action procedures.33 In addition, although the I99I revision of the 
2S See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Su-
songfa" Ruogan Wenti De Yijian [Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Questions 
Concerning the Implementation of the "Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China"] 
[hereinafter SPC Interpretation], 1992 SPC GAZETTE, NO.3, at 70, art. 59. 
26 See id. art. 62. 
27 See CPL, supra note I, art. 55. 
28 See id. If the parties are unable to select representatives, the court may select them after 
consultation with the parties. See id. The notice period must last at least thirty days. See SPC 
Interpretation, supra note 25, art. 63. 
29 See CPL, supra note I, arts. 54 & 55. 
30 See id. arts. 54 & 55. 
31 See id. art. 55. Article 55 thus suggests that decisions are not binding on nonparticipants. 
However, the practical effects of this provision are unclear, as courts may be unwilling to accept a 
separate case on the same matter if a class action is undenvay. Furthermore, it may be impracti-
cal for a plaintiff to wait to bring suit until the end of the class action because the litigation pe-
riod, generally two years, is likely to expire before the class action is resolved. 
32 Cf. Helena Kolenda, Jerome A. Cohen & Michael R March, People's Republic of China, in 1 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LITIGATION China I, China 30 (Anthony 
Colman ed., 1996) ("The procedure when one or more joined parties do not consent to action by 
the representative where consent is required [is] left unaddressed and presumably subject to the 
court's discretion."); MlNsm SUSONG FA JI PEITAO GUIDING XINsm XINJIE [NEW 
EXPLANATIONS OF THE CML PROCEDURE LAW AND ACCOMPANYING REGULATIONS] 163 
(Liang Shuwen, Hui Huming & Yang Rongxin eds., 1996) (stating that the CPL does not specify 
the procedures to be followed in class actions, but that the basic procedures can be inferred from 
the legislation's spirit and the SPC Interpretation). 
33 The procedural flexibility courts possess may facilitate experimentation. Chinese courts "are 
less rigidly regulated by detailed technical rules or by a clear conceptual demarcation between the 
judicial and administrative functions" than are courts in the West. CHEN, supra note 14, at 112. 
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CPL produced a flurry of Chinese academic writing describing articles 
54 and 55, and praising the procedures for increasing the efficiency of 
the judicial system34 and helping to resolve complex cases,35 there has 
been little academic analysis of actual cases.36 
II. CLASS ACTION SUITS 
Post-I991 class actions have been notably varied in character. 
They range from a suit brought by thirty-four plaintiffs against a 
company in which they had purchased preferred shares for failure to 
pay dividends,37 to a suit brought by more than eighty airline passen-
gers for damages suffered as a result of a delayed plane,38 to a suit by 
students against the publisher and seller of low-quality legal text-
books.39 Class actions appear to have been most common in disputes 
over low quality products, consumer fraud, environmental pollution, 
economic contracts, and local government actions. 
In one high profile case, 300 Beijing consumers sued six Beijing 
department stores and watch wholesalers after purchasing watches 
marketed to celebrate the one hundredth anniversary of Mao Zedong's 
birth.40 Advertisements for the watches had claimed that they were 
manufactured with gold and diamonds, but the watches were in fact 
low-quality imitations.41 After accepting the case, originally brought 
34 See, e.g., Feng Tao, Qiantan Jituan Susong [An Introductory Discussion of Class Action 
Litigation], 1992 RENMIN SIFA [PEOPLE'S JUDICATURE], NO.4, at 25, 26. 
35 See, e.g., Zhang Wusheng, Daibiaoren Susong Zhidu Chutan [An Initial Exploration of the 
System of Representative Litigation], HENAN DAXUE XUEBAO (SHEHUI KEXUEBAN) [JOURNAL 
OF HENAN UNIVERSITY (SOCIAL SCIENCES EDITION)], May 1993, at 8S, 86. 
36 See 1998 Academic Interview A. 
37 See Zhou Diwu Deng 34 Ren Su Hengyang Shi Feilong Gufen Youxian Gongsi An Yuan-
ding Youxiangu Lirun Zhifu Guxi Jiufen An [The Case of 34 People Including Zhou Diwu Suing 
the Hengyang Municipality Feilong Limited Stock Company in a Dispute for the Payment of 
Stock Dividends in Accordance with the Originally Agreed Rate of Interest for Preferred Shares], 
1994 RENMIN FA YUAN ANLI XUAN [SELECTED CASES FROM THE PEOPLE'S COURTS], No. I, at 
lIO, lIo-II. The court ruled for the plaintiffs, ordering interest to be paid in accordance with the 
original notice of public offering. See id. at II2-I3. 
38 See Yuan Jiang, Er Liishi "Shuaituan" Zhuanggao Hangkong Gongsi [1Wo Lawyers "Com-
mand a Group" in Suit Against Airline], 1994 ZHONGGUO LUSH! [CHINESE LAWYER], NO.4, at 
30. 
39 See Liu Linshan & Wang Xin, Falii Jiaocai Zhiliang Dilie Wuren Zidi: Tianjin Qishiming 
Xuesheng Shang Gongtang [Poor Quality Legal Teaching Materials Lead the Younger Generation 
Astray: Seventy Tianjin Students Go to Court], FAZH! RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY), Jan. 27, 
1996, at 2. 
40 See Li Zhiping & Zhong Yinli, Fengxian Haishi Qizha: Jinian Mao Zedong Zuanshi Jin-
biao Fengbo Jishi [An Offering of Respect or Fraud: A Record of the Storm Over Diamond and 
Gold Mao Zedong Commemorative Watches], ZHONGGUO JINGYINGBAO [CHINA MANAGEMENT 
NEWS], July 5, 1994, at 3; 1996 Academic Interview S. 
41 See Li & Zhong, supra note 40; Li Zhiping, "Man Tianxing" Shifo }'iran Cuican? ''Jinian 
Mao Zedong Zuanshi Jinbiao" An Shimo [Is a "Sky Full of Stars" Still Resplendent? From Start 
to Finish in the Case of the Mao Zedong Commemorative Diamond and Gold Watches], 
ZHONG GUO XIAOFEIZHE BAO [CHINA CONSUMER NEWS], Jan. 3, 1996, at 2. 
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by twenty-six plaintiffs,42 the Beijing Xuanwu District Court pub-
lished an advertisement in the Beijing Evening News instructing all 
those who had purchased the watches and wished to participate in the 
litigation to register with the court.43 At the conclusion of the trial, the 
court ordered the defendants to accept the return of the watches and 
refund the purchase price, to pay damages of 2700 to 3000 yuan44 for 
each watch, and to pay fees and costs associated with the litigation.45 
Peasants have brought numerous class actions for damages suffered 
from low quality fertilizers and seeds.46 In Sichuan, for example, 6132 
peasant households sued four defendants, including the seller and 
manufacturer of substandard fertilizer, for 2.3 million yuan after the 
fertilizer destroyed cotton crops.47 Class actions arising from contrac-
tual and financial disputes include a successful suit by 146 peasants 
against a livestock company for reneging on a contract to pay the 
peasants to raise martens,48 a suit for back pay,49 and suits over the 
supply of natural gas to individual households. 50 
42 See 1996 Academic Interview S. 
43 See Beijing Shi Xuanwu Qu Renmin Fayuan Minshi Panjueshu Xuanmin Chuzi Di 980 
Hao [Civil Decision of People's Court of Xuanwu District, Beijing Municipality, Decision No. 
980], at 3-4 (1994) [hereinafter Xuanwu Civil Decision 980]. 
44 At current exchange rates one U.S. dollar = 8.2789 yuan. See Prices and Trends, FAR E. 
ECON. REv., Mar. 12, 1998, at 58. 
4S See Xuanwu Civil Decision 980, supra note 43, at 6. The original price of each watch was 
7800 yuan for women's watches and 8800 yuan for men's watches. See id. at 3. The six defen-
dants appealed the decision; the appeal is pending before the Beijing Intermediate People's Court. 
See 1997 Academic Interview B. 
46 See, e.g., Chen Gang & Huang Xianan, Fuyang Jin Liangqian Hu Nongmin Taohui Gong-
dao [Nearly 2000 Peasant Households in Fuyang Receive Justice], FAzm RmAO [LEGAL SYSTEM 
DAILY], Feb. 20, 1996, at II (reporting that 1994 farmers won more than two million yuan in a 
suit against the sellers of fake seeds); Lu Fengshan, Kaiyuan Fayuan Shenjie Nongmin Jituan 
Susong An [Kaiyuan Court Resolves a Peasant Class Action Case], FAZm RmAO [LEGAL SYSTEM 
DAILY], Apr. 18, 1996, at 3 (reporting that 215 farmers won 90,000 yuan in a suit against a fertil-
izer factory). 
47 See Zhou Dewei, Zhongjiang Fayuan Wei Liuqian Miannong Zhui Peichang [Zhongjiang 
Court Seeks Compensation for Six Thousand Cotton Growers], FAZm RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM 
DAILY], Jan. 16, 1995, at 3. The court awarded the plaintiffs damages of 1.8 million yuan plus 
litigation expenses. See id. 
48 See Zhang Dong & Wu Xibin, Yiqi Jituan Susongan De Chenggong Daili [Successful Repre-
sentation in a Class Action], 1995 ZHONG GUO L"Osm [CHINESE LAWYER], No.6, at 4. 
49 See Chen Baiqing, Renmin Fayuan Xianweili Wu Nian Jiufen San Ri Jie: 20 Ming Zhigong 
Shang Gongtang Taohui Gong Dao [People's Court Shows its Power by Resolving Five-Year Dis-
pute in Three Days: 20 Workers Go to Court to Obtain Justice], FAzm RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM 
DAILY], May 15, 1995, at 3 (reporting that 20 workers successfully sued their former employer for 
back pay). 
so See Chongqing Xiaofeizhe Su Yehuaqi Gongying Zhan Weiyue An [Chongqing Consumers 
Sue the Liquefied Gas Supply Station for Breach of Contract], in SHENGCHAN JINGYING 
XxAOFEIZHE QUANYl FAL"O BAOHU ANu JINGXI [ANALYSIS OF CASES RELATING TO THE 
LEGAL PROTECTION OF RIGHTS OF PRODUCERS, MANAGERS, AND CONSUMERS] [hereinafter 
RIGHTS OF PRODUCERS, MANAGERS, AND CONSUMERS] 386 <yang Li & Liu Yanling eds., 1996); 
Hefei Shi Xiaofeizhe Su Yehuaqi Gongsi Weiyue An [Hefei Municipality Consumers Sue the Li-
quefied Gas Company for Breach of Contract], in RIGHTS OF PRODUCERS, MANAGERS, AND 
CONSUMERS, supra, at 387. 
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Environmental class actions have included claims for harm suf-
fered from air,Sl noise,52 and waterS3 pollution. In Liu Shiyou v. Xuz-
hou Fangting Liquor Factory,54 eight village households brought suit 
against four companies that polluted the local river, killing thousands 
of ducks and fish that were the villagers' primary source of income.55 
The villagers won more than 700,000 yuan in damages. 56 
China's Administrative Litigation Law,57 which provides for suits 
challenging government action, does not explicitly permit class ac-
tions.58 Nevertheless, plaintiffs have brought numerous administrative 
class actions, apparently borrowing the procedural framework of the 
Civil Procedure Law.59 In Sichuan, for example, thirty-two house-
51 See Huang Jingde & Xiao Chengchi, Taihe Xian Liushiyi Hu Nongmin Suzhu FaW Huode 
Peichang [Sixty-one Peasant Households in Taihe County Win Compensation by Bringing Suit), 
F AZm RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY), Oct. 31, 1996, at 6 (reporting the settlement of a suit by 61 
peasant households against brick factories for damage to their crops caused by air pollution). 
52 See Cao Dengrun, Liise de Nahan [A Green Cry), FAzm RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY), 
July 18, 1996, at 3 (reporting a successful suit by 39 households against a neighboring hotel); Liu 
Shaoren, Fanrong Xia De Yinying - Beijing Fuwai Dajie Sihao Lou Jumin JUuan Su Fuxing 
Shangyecheng Jishi [In the Shadow oj Prosperity - A Record oj the Class Suit by Residents of 
Building Number Four oj Beijing's Fuwai Street Against the Fuxing Shopping Center), 
ZHONGGUO HUANjING BAO [CmNA ENVIRONMENT NEWS), July I, 1995, at 3 (detailing a suit 
by 404 residents of an apartment building against a department store for noise pollution). 
53 See Zhang Peixue & Fang Zhigang, Hegang Wuran An Fasheng Zhihou [Aftermath oj the 
Hegang Pollution Case), ZHONG GUO HUANjING BAO [CmNA ENVIRONMENT NEWS), Oct. 26, 
1996, at 3 (reporting a successful suit by 733 households against a polluting factory). 
54 Pei2hou Shi Renmin Fayuan Minshi Panjue Shu Peimin Chuzi Di 1317 Hao [Civil Decision 
of tl1e People's Court of Peizhou Municipality, Decision No. 1317) (1994) [hereinafter Peizhou 
Civil Decision 13 I 7). 
55 See Lin Yu, Shuihuan Mengyu Hu: Fangtingheshui Wuran An Jiutuo Bujue Baixing Shetl-
shou Qiku [A Water Disaster More Fierce than a Tiger: Hundreds Suffer Deeply from Negative 
Consequences as the Fangting River Pollution Case is Delayed and Not Resolved], ZHONG GUO 
HUANjING BAO [CmNA ENVIRONMENT NEWS), May II, 1996, at 3. 
56 See Bai Yu, Fangtinghe Shuiwuran An Yishen Yuangao Shengsu [Plaintiffs Win Initial 
Judgment in Fangting River Pollution Case), ZHONGGUO HUAN]lNG BAO [CmNA 
ENVIRONMENT NEWS), June I, 1996, at 3. The case combined two separate actions, one class 
action brought by people whose fish died as a result of the pollution, and another action brought 
by two farmers whose ducks were killed by tl1e pollution. See Peizhou Civil Decision 1317, supra 
note 54, at 1-2; Pei2hou Shi Renmin Fayuan Minshi Panjue Shu Peimin Chuzi Di 1318 Hao [Civil 
Decision of the People's Court of Pei2hou Municipality, Decision No. 1318], at I (1994). An ap-
peal is pending before the Xuzhou Intermediate People's Court. See 1998 Academic Interview A. 
57 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa [people's Republic of China Adminis-
trative Litigation Law), 1989 FAGUI HUIBIAN I. 
58 Article 26 of the law does, however, permit joint suits, and article 27 permits third parties to 
join an action by applying voluntarily or after being notified by the court. See id. arts. 26-27. 
59 See, e.g., Wang Wei, Wuqian Cunmin Zhuanggao Huanbaoju: Jianhu Xian Youji Huagong-
chang Wuran Huanjing JiuJen Caijang Ji [Five Thousand Villagers Sue Environmental Protection 
Bureau: A Record oj Investigation into the Dispute over Pollution from the Jianlm County Or-
ganic Chemical Factory], ZHONG GUO HUAN]lNG BAO [CmNA ENVIRONMENT NEWS), July 22, 
1995, at 3 (reporting a suit by 5000 peasants against a local environmental protection department 
for failure to take action against a polluting chemical factory); Xiang Peng, Tian Cai & Qi Feng, 
Shouli Jihua Shengyu JUuan Susong An Shenjie: I43 Nongmin Zhuanggao Xiatlg Zhengfu 
Zhongshen Shengsu [The First Family Planning Class Action is Decided: I43 Peasants Win a Fi-
nal Judgment in a Suit Against Township Government], F Azm RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], 
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holds sued the local township government for imposing excessive fees 
on villagers.6o The court followed the CPL provisions governing class 
actions, allowing the households to select two representatives.61 
ID. LITIGATION AS POLICY: STRUCTURAL TENSIONS 
The apparent rise in the number of class actions in China and the 
diversity of their subject matter illustrate a larger trend toward in-
creased use of the courts to resolve disputes. China's courts heard ap-
proximately I6% more cases in I996 than in I995,62 continuing an ex-
pansion that began in the I980s.63 This increase stems in part from a 
dramatic increase in disputes, particularly economic disputes, in re-
form-era China,64 but also from a government policy of enhancing the 
importance of the courts and, consequently, litigation.6s Litigation has 
grown at a much faster rate than mediation,66 and traditional govern-
Feb. 13, 1995, at 3 (describing a suit against the local township government by 143 peasants pro-
testing a fine for an alleged violation of family planning policies); cf. Xing Hongfei & Li Xiang-
yang, Xingzheng Susongzhong De Falii Zhangai Jiqi Duice Yanjiu [Research into Legal Impedi-
ments in Administrative Suits and Measures for Countering Them], 1994 NANJING DAXUE 
XUEBAO (ZHEXUE, RENWEN, SHEHUI KEXUE) rJOURNAL OF NANJING UNIVERSITY 
(PHILOSOPHY, HUMANlTIES, AND SOCIAL SCIENCES)], No.2, at 129, 130 (noting that the Su-
preme People's Court has stated that in cases for which the Administrative Litigation Law does 
not include relevant provisions, courts may follow the CPL, and arguing that administrative class 
actions are essential to correct administrative errors and to prevent abuses of power). 
60 See Li Shian Deng 32 Hu Nongmin Buju Gaobanzhen Renmin Zheng[u Weifa Yaoqiu Lii-
xing Yiwu An 132 Peasant Households Including Li Shian Bring Case Against the Gaoban Town-
ship People's Government for Illegally Requiring the Carrying out of Responsibilities], 1994 
RENMIN FAYUAN ANu XUAN [SELECTED CASES FROM THE PEOPLE'S COURTS], NO.3, at 193, 
193· 
61 See id. The court ruled for the plaintiffs, ordering the local government to return fees it had 
collected and enjoining the future collection of such fees. See id. at 194-95. 
62 See Ren Jianxin, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao [Supreme People's Court Work 
Report], 1997 SPC GAZETTE, No.2, at 55, 55. Between 1991 and 1995, the number of economic 
cases increased by an average of 22.57% a year. See China's Supreme People's Court Work Re-
port, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Apr. 9, 1996, at 3. 
63 See Edward J. Epstein, Law and Legitimation in Post-Mao China, in DOMESTIC LAW 
REFORMS IN POST-MAo CHINA 19, 38 (pitman B. Potter ed., 1994) (stating that the number of 
civil cases doubled and the number of economic cases quadrupled between 1982 and 1991). 
64 Cf. YEARBOOK (1996), supra note 2, at 124-25 (noting a rise in economic cases stemming 
from the increased complexity of economic relations and the widening scope of cases handled by 
courts). 
6S See CHEN, supra note 14, at II5-17; Fu Hualing, Understanding People's Mediation in 
Post-Mao China, 6 J. CHINESE L. 2II, 217 (1992) (discussing government efforts to direct disputes 
to the courts). 
66 Between 1990 and 1994, the total number of cases heard in courts of first instance increased 
from 2,916,774 to 3,955,475. See Zhongguo Falii Nianjian Bianji Bu [Law Yearbook of China 
Editorial Department], ZHONGGUO FAL"O NIANJIAN (1991) [LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA (1991)] 
933 (1991) [hereinafter YEARBOOK (1991)]; Zhongguo Falii Nianjian Bianji Bu [Law Yearbook of 
China Editorial Department], ZHONGGUO FAL"O NIANJIAN (1995) [LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA 
(1995)] [hereinafter YEARBOOK (1995)] 1063. During the same period, the number of disputes re-
solved through people's mediation committees declined from 7,409,222 to 6,123,729. See 
YEARBOOK (1991), supra, at 956; YEARBOOK (1995), supra, at 1081. Similarly, the percentage of 
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ment disdain for litigation has declined.67 Class actions may further 
encourage the use of the COUrts.68 The prospect of group action 
through class suits should reduce the traditional reluctance of indi-
viduals to use the courts, particularly in cases in which the defendant 
is a government department or enterprise or possesses significant eco-
nomic clout.69 Additionally, class actions may make litigation more 
economically feasible by allowing plaintiffs to pool their resources to 
hire counsel and cover litigation costs. 
The precise reasons for the apparent official encouragement of liti-
gation are unclear. Changing economic and social relationships mean 
that disputes increasingly involve parties who are at arm's length; me-
diation may be less effective in such circumstances. 70 Government-
sponsored mediation may also be less effective in a society in which 
state control over individuals continues to decrease. Yet class actions 
also illustrate that increasing the role of courts in dispute resolution 
may grant the government a measure of control over disputes. For ex-
civil cases brought in the courts that were resolved through court-supervised mediation decreased 
from 65% in 1990 to 58% in 1994. See YEARBOOK (1991), supra, at 934; YEARBOOK (1995), su-
pra, at 1064. 
Comparing litigation and mediation rates is difficult, in part because mediation may occur in a 
range of settings. Cj. Donald C. Clarke, Dispute Resolution in China, 5 J. ClUNESE L. 245, 256-
57,270--86 (1991) (discussing various settings in which mediation is conducted). 
67 One manifestation of this shift is the CPL itself. Whereas the 1982 Civil Procedure Law (for 
'Ilial Implementation) stated that courts should emphasize mediation, see CPL (for 'Ilial Imple-
mentation), supra note 20, art. 6, the 1991 CPL provides for courts to conduct mediation on a vol-
untary basis, see CPL, supra note I, art. 9. Official policy in the early years of the People's Re-
public explicitly discouraged any form of adjudication. See Jerome Alan Cohen, Chinese 
Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1201, 1201 (1966). 
68 Despite increased litigation rates, there is little evidence concerning whether individuals are 
increasingly bringing suit in courts instead of, or in addition to, bringing their grievances to the 
relevant administrative authorities. Chinese academics comment that most people with griev-
ances do not distinguish between courts and other government actors. See 1998 Academic Inter-
view A; 1996 Academic Interview Y. Evidence from class actions suggests that, although disputes 
are increasingly likely to be brought to the courts, there are no clear trends regarding whether 
such cases are brought in addition to, after, or in place of the filing of complaints with administra-
tive departments. In many class actions, plaintiffs appear to resort to the courts only after com-
plaints to the relevant administrative authorities fail. See, e.g., Lan Meng, Fating Xuanpan: Huan 
Nongmin Baiwan "Baitiao" [Court Rules: Return Peasants' Million in "White Notes"], 1995 
MINzHU Yu FAun [DEMOCRACY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM], NO.5, at 16, 16-17 (describing a 
suit brought after the local government failed to respond to plaintiffs' demands). In other cases, 
plaintiffs appear to pursue a dual-edged attack, using the courts and the administrative system 
concurrently. See, e.g., Li, supra note 41 (reporting that plaintiffs both complained to the gov-
ernment quality control association and filed suit). In still other cases, however, plaintiffs have 
filed suit without attempting to resolve their cases through administrative authorities, see, e.g., 
Yuan, supra note 38 (describing a suit filed without first complaining to the relevant administra-
tive authority), or have been advised by administrative organs to sue, see 1996 Academic Inter-
viewY. 
69 For example, labor law experts state that in many cases in which workers bring successful 
complaints against their employers, the employers later punish the workers. See 1996 Academic 
Interview L; 1996 Lawyer Interview B. Group litigation may lessen the risk of such reprisals. 
70 See Ross, supra note II, at 64. 
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ample, commentators have praised the ability of class actions to re-
solve disputes that might otherwise lead to social unrest. 71 
Class actions also demonstrate that increased dispute resolution in 
China's courts may facilitate other government policies. The numer-
ous class actions brought by peasants against local officials or local 
economic interests have coincided with a government campaign to 
lessen burdens on peasants.72 Consumer class actions have appeared 
against the backdrop of a government effort to strengthen consumer 
rights and crack down on fraudulent products. Environmental class 
actions are consistent with government efforts to strengthen environ-
mental protection. Although class actions often involve clashes with 
local policies, many class action plaintiffs are actually trying to force 
local authorities to follow national laws. 
Yet functional weaknesses in the courts undermine the effectiveness 
of government efforts to enhance the importance of litigation and the 
courts. Such weaknesses are particularly evident in class actions, 
which, although designed to improve judicial efficiency, suffer from 
the limited competence and capacity of the courts.73 Already suffering 
from a lack of resources, courts are required to assume new tasks: they 
must notify prospective class members, supervise the appointment of 
class representatives, and if plaintiffs are successful, oversee the distri-
bution of awards to large numbers of individuals. As a result, many 
judges resist accepting class actions out of fear that the cases will be 
too complex.74 Moreover, judges are often evaluated based on the 
number of cases they process, and thus are sometimes unwilling to 
take on a class action.75 
Class actions also demonstrate that increasing the role courts play 
in resolving disputes also requires addressing disincentives to litigate. 
Chinese observers note that individuals are reluctant to assume risks 
associated with bringing a class action when the benefits of the action 
71 See, e.g., Zhang & Wu, supra note 48, at 5 (stating that one case was a success in part be-
cause it resolved a dispute involving more than 100 people, with no detriment to social stability). 
Many disputes do appear to result in violence. See, e.g., Wang, supra note 59 (reporting that vil-
lagers attacked a polluting factory and forced it to shut down); Ci An Ruhe Liaoduan? [How Can 
This Case Be Decided?], ZHONG GUO HUANJING BAO [CHINA ENVIRONMENT NEWS], Oct. 26, 
1993, at 3 (describing a similar incident). 
72 Cj. O'Brien & Li, supra note 12, at 764 ("The Chinese government, in reforming itself, has 
begun to give villagers more protection against cadre retaliation and more laws ... to point to 
when filing charges."). 
73 Commentators note that other problems that plague the courts, notably local protectionism 
and corruption, are particularly acute in class actions, perhaps because such cases often involve 
large sums of money. See Lin, supra note 55; 1996 Academic Interview V. 
74 See 1996 Academic Interview CC. 
75 See 1996 Academic Interview CC; 1996 Judge Interview A; 1996 Lawyer Interview C. In 
some cases judges have refused to accept class actions, forcing plaintiffs to bring mUltiple similar 
individual actions. See 1996 Academic Interview CC; 1996 Judge Interview A; 1996 Lawyer In-
terview C. In others, judges have accepted class actions on the condition that they be permitted 
to count such actions as multiple cases. See 1996 Lawyer Interview H. 
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will accrue to others,76 and state that it is often difficult to organize af-
fected individuals into a class.77 When the defendant is a powerful lo-
cal interest or is linked to the local government, individuals may fear 
retaliation, particularly against the class representative.78 
Court fees also discourage class actions. In most civil cases, plain-
tiffs must pay a filing fee, which is set according to the amount in dis-
pute.79 CPL article r07 permits courts to reduce or waive these fees 
when the courts deem it appropriate,80 and the Supreme People's 
Court has stated that in class actions brought pursuant to CPL article 
55, court fees shall be paid by the losing party.81 Despite these provi-
sions, lawyers who have litigated class actions say that they are wary 
of not paying the fees in advance because courts rely heavily on such 
fees; lawyers fear requests for waivers will bias judges against their 
clients.82 Although in theory each class member is responsible for 
paying her share of court fees if the suit is unsuccessful, in practice the 
fee requirement discourages individuals from serving as class represen-
tatives for fear that they will be forced to pay all of the litigation fees 
if the class loses.83 Court fees may also discourage cases in which each 
individual claim is small. 84 Additionally, representatives may incur a 
variety of other costs, including attorneys' fees, travel expenses, and 
costs associated with preparing evidence.85 Moreover, the time and 
energy required of class representatives dissuades individuals from 
serving as representatives.86 
76 See 1996 Academic Interview CCj 1996 Lawyer Interview H. 
77 See 1996 Academic Interview CC. 
78 See, e.g., Lan, supra note 68, at 18 (describing efforts by family members of class representa-
tives to dissuade them from serving as representatives in a suit against the local government). 
79 See CPL, supra note I, art. 107j Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People's Court), Renmin 
Fayuan Susong Shoufei Banfa [provisions for the Collection of Litigation Fees by People's 
Courts), July 12, 1989, in 2 ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO FALO FAGUI QUANSHU 
[COMPLETE LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REpUBLIC OF CHINA) 1329 (1994), art. 
5 (establishing a sliding fee schedule according to the amount in controversy). 
80 See CPL, supra note I, art. 107. 
81 See SPC Interpretation, supra note 25, art. 129. 
82 See 1996 Academic Interview CCj 1996 Lawyer Interview Hj cj. Liu Qiaofa, Minshi Shen-
pan Zhong Qing Chengxu De Xianxiang, Yuanyin Jiqi Jiuzheng [Causes oj and Solutions to the 
Phenomenon oj Deemphasizing Procedure in Civil Adjudication), 1995 XIANDAI FAXUE 
[MODERN LEGAL STUDIES), NO.5, at 66, 67 (noting that courts often are short of funds to cover 
their own operational costs). 
83 See 1996 Academic Interview V. 
84 See Yang Qinwei, Tan XiaoJeizhe Quanyi Zhengyizhong De Jituan Susong Wenti [A Discus-
sion oj Issues Relating to Class Actions in Consumer Rights Disputes), 1995 JING]I FAZHI 
[ECONOMIC LEGAL SYSTEM), NO.9, at 34, 36. 
85 Cj. Lan, supra note 68, at 18 (stating that class representatives incurred 5000 yuan in costs 
in the course of the case). 
86 See Gui Rong & Xiong Zhiqiang, Liidi YinJa De Guansi [A Case Arisingfrom Green Land), 
ZHONGGUO HUAN]ING BAO [CHINA ENVIRONMENT NEWS), Apr. 28, 1996, at Ij 1996 Academic 
Interview Vj 1996 Lawyer Interview H. 
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Even when class action cases are brought, there are impediments to 
others joining the class. It is often difficult for class members to moni-
tor the activities of their representatives.87 Judges in some cases exac-
erbate such problems by not permitting plaintiffs to select their own 
representatives, instead assigning local officials to represent the class, 
even when such officials' interests clash with those of the people they 
are representing.88 Further, affected individuals may not find out 
about actions that concern them.89 Moreover, the ability of individuals 
who do not participate in the class action to reap the benefits of a suc-
cessful verdict produces free riders, discouraging individuals from par-
ticipating in collective suits.90 
The wide range of cases discussed in Part IT indicates that indi-
viduals are willing to bring class actions despite multiple impediments. 
Nevertheless, the numerous difficulties plaintiffs confront in class suits 
demonstrate that the existence of class action procedures alone may 
not be sufficient to increase access to the courts dramatically. Tension 
between the government policy of increasing the courts' role in re-
solving disputes and the numerous barriers to effective use of the 
courts may be just one manifestation of the divergence of law and re-
ality that plagues much of Chinese law,91 but this tension may also re-
flect broader government ambivalence toward the potential conse-
quences of widespread use of litigation. 
87 See Jiang & Xiao, supra note 16, at 7; Liu Lei, Guanyu Woguo Daibiaoren Susong Zhidu De 
Jingjixue Fenxi [An Economic Analysis of the Representative Action System in Our Nation], 1997 
FASHANG YANJIU [LAW AND BUSINESS RESEARCH], No. I, at 72,75; Zhang, supra note 35, at 88. 
88 See Zhang Kaiji, Jituan Susong Ruogan Wenti [Some Questions Regarding Class Action 
Suits], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], June IS, 1995, at 7j see also Zhang & Wu, supra 
note 48 (noting that class representatives sometimes fail to represent the interests of the class). 
89 Although in some cases class actions have been publicized in popular newspapers or even on 
television, see Li, supra note 41j Zhang & Wu, supra note 48, in other cases notices are published 
in legal newspapers or court circulars, providing little chance that potential class members will 
learn of the action; see 1996 Academic Interview V. But cf. Zhou Hui, Nanjing, Wubai Bashi Ren 
Jituan Susong [580 People in Nanjing Bring a Class Action], NANFANG ZHOUMO [SOUTHERN 
WEEKEND], Sept. 2, 1994, at 5 (stating that 612 of 855 consumers affected by a class action re-
sponded to a notice in the Jiangsu Legal System News). All class actions to date appear to be lo-
cal, with notification given only in the area in which the case is filed. 
90 See Liu, supra note 87, at 74 (arguing that individuals who did not register in the class ac-
tion but who filed suit within the statute of limitations should have their award reduced by dou-
ble the per capita litigation costs of those who registered). In one environmental class action, nu-
merous plaintiffs refused to participate, stating that they would sue only if the class action were 
successful. See 1996 Lawyer Interview H; see also Lan, supra note 68, at 17 (suggesting that indi-
viduals originally unwilling to participate in class actions joined suit after it became apparent that 
the plaintiffs would win). 
91 See PETER HOWARD CORNE, FOREIGN INvESTMENT IN CHINA: THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
LEGAL SYSTEM I-50 (1997). 
HeinOnline --- 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1536 (1997-1998)
HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. II 1:1523 
Iv. CONTROL OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENT: THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
The rise of class actions and the increase in litigation have coin-
cided with the rapid growth of the Chinese legal profession. Class ac-
tions are almost certain to increase incentives for lawyers to undertake 
difficult cases. However, the strength of such incentives will depend 
both on China's regulation of lawyers' fees and on the specific roles 
lawyers are permitted to play in class action litigation. 
The number of lawyers in China has risen from 3000 lawyers in 
198092 to 100,200 in 1996.93 This number is expected to reach 150,000 
by the year 2000.94 Concurrently, lawyers have become increasingly 
profit-driven. China first permitted lawyers to organize into nons tate 
law firms in 1988,95 but until the promulgation of the 1996 Lawyers 
Law96 all lawyers remained "state legal workers."97 Lawyers are now 
largely free to choose their own cases, and to run their law practices as 
quasi-businesses. 
Despite this growth, most cases in China are litigated without the 
assistance of counsel,98 and lawyers ostensibly remain subject to strict 
fee regulation. Such regulation has caused lawyers to avoid complex 
or difficult cases.99 Fees for legal services are fixed at low levels; for 
example, fees for economic cases and civil cases involving property are 
92 See William P. Alford, Tasselled Loafers for Barefoot Lawyers: 1'ransfonnation and Tension 
in the World of Chinese Legal Workers, CHINA Q., Mar. 1995, at 22,22. 
93 See More Lawyers, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 3, 1997, at 3. 
94 See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CHINA'S 
STRUGGLE TO DEVELOP A LEGAL PROFESSION: THE NEW LAWYERS LAW 12 (forthcoming 1998) 
(manuscript on file with the Harvard Law School Library). Despite the rapid increase in the 
number of lawyers, many are poorly trained. See id. at 12-13; Alford, supra note 92, at 31. 
95 See Timothy A. Gelatt, Lawyers in China: The Past Decade and Beyond, 23 J. lNT'L L. & 
POL. 751, 789 (1991). At present, 76% of law offices in China remain state-run. See Chen Yanni, 
Law Sector Progresses Rapidly, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 27, 1997, at I. 
96 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lilshi Fa [People's Republic of China Lawyers Law] [herein-
after Lawyers Law], in 1996 ZHONGHUA REmnN GONGHEGUO XIN FAGUI HUIBIAN 
[COLLECTED NEW LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REpUBLIC OF CHINA], No.2, at 
39. The Lawyers Law explicitly permits lawyers to form law firms as cooperatives or as partner-
ships. See id. arts. 17 & 18. 
97 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Liishi Zanxing Tiaoli [Interim Regulations of the People's 
Republic of China on Lawyers], 1980 FAGUI HUIBIAN 44, art. I. The Lawyers Law states that 
lawyers must accept supervision from the state and society, but does not term them state workers. 
See Lawyers Law, supra note 96, arts. 3-4. But cf. PEERENBOOM, supra note 94, at 28 (noting 
that the Lawyers Law "still defines a lawyer as someone who provides legal services to society, as 
opposed to individual clients,,). 
98 In 1995 the Supreme People's Court reported hearing 4,889,353 cases, while lawyers re-
ported participating in just 863,574. See YEARBOOK (1996), supra note 2, at 957,975. 
99 See Chen Wuneng & Song Yuhong, Jianli Fuhe Woguo Guoqing De Lilshi Shoufei Zhidu 
[Establish a System of Lawyers Fees Suitable to Our Nation's Conditions], 1996 ZHONG GUO 
L'OSHI [CHINESE LAWYER], NO.3, at 40, 41; Ma Hongjun, Lun Woguo De Lilshi Shoufei Zhidu 
[A Discussion of Our Nation's System of Lawyers Fees], 1996 FAXUE PmGLUN [LAW REVIEW], 
NO.2, at 75,77. 
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capped at three percent of the amount in controversy.-lOo China's strict 
fee regulation has led to widespread disregard of the fee limits. IOI 
Lawyers publicly state that their fees comply with the national fee 
standards,I02 but many comment privately that few follow the stan-
dards, and that use of contingency fees is widespread. l03 Commenta-
tors have argued that the fee system should be revised to authorize cli-
ents and lawyers to negotiate fees lO4 and to allow contingency fees. lOS 
The effect of regulations on lawyers' fees in class actions is unclear. 
Press accounts have reported that plaintiffs have had difficulties af-
fording lawyers in class actions. I06 Lawyers who have represented 
plaintiff classes say that such cases are rarely profitable when com-
pared to opportunities available in commercial practice.107 Yet law-
100 See Caizheng Bu, Sifa Bu & Guojia Wujia Ju [Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice & 
State Price Bureau], Liishi Yewu Shoufei Biaozhun [Fee Standards for Legal Services], Feb. 15, 
1990, in ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO FAL'O FENLEI ZONGLAN: GUO]IA FAXINGZHENG 
FA JUAN [CLASSIFIED COMPENDIUM OF THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REpUBUC OF CHINA: 
NATIONAL LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW VOLUME] [hereinafter COMPENDIUM] 414 (1994), 
art. 4. Although the amount may be doubled for difficult cases, see Caizheng Bu, Sifa Bu & Guo-
jia Wujia Ju [Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice & State Price Bureau], Liishi Yewu Shoufei 
Guanli Banfa [Administrative Measures on Lawyers Services Fees] [hereinafter Administrative 
Measures], Feb. 15, 1990, in COMPENDIUM, supra, at 413, art. 8, commentators have criticized the 
system because the fee, even if doubled, is often small and unrelated to the amount of work re-
quired, see Chen & Song, supra note 99, at 41j Ma, supra note 99, at 76-77. 
The current status of the Fee Standards is unclear. The standards were enacted pursuant to 
the 1990 Administrative Measures on Lawyers Services Fees. See Administrative Measures, su-
pra, art. 16. In 1997, new measures replaced the 1990 Administrative Measures. The new meas-
ures state that new fee standards will be issued; however, none have been issued to date. See 
Guojia Jihua Weiyuan Hui & Sifa Bu [State Planning Commission & Ministry of Justice], Liishi 
Fuwu Shoufei Guanli Zanxing Banfa [provisional Measures on the Administration of Fees for 
Lawyers Services], Mar. 3, 1997, arts. 4, 20. The 1997 Measures state that fees for property dis-
putes will be calculated based on the amount in controversy, see id. art. 7, although they instruct 
the Ministry of Justice to consider a range of factors in setting the fee levels, including the diffi-
culo/ of the matter and the amount of time it requires, see id. art. 6. 
101 See Qing Feng, Lushi Shoufei Zhidu Gaige Tantao [An Investigation into Reform of the 
Lawyers Fees System], 1997 ZHONG GUO L'OSHl [CHINESE LAWYER], NO.7, at 42, 42 (maintain-
ing that the 1990 fee standards exist in name only, due to a failure to adjust for inflation); 1997 
Lawyer Interview A (stating that lawyers often charge in excess of the permitted amount). 
102 See, e.g., Zhang & Wu, supra note 48, at 5. 
103 For example, one Beijing lawyer remarked that contingency fees of ten percent of the 
amount in dispute are common. See 1997 Lawyer Interview A. Another observer stated that 
some Beijing lawyers are now charging contingency fees of thirty to forty percent. See 1998 Aca-
demic Interview A. 
104 See Qing, supra note 101, at 42-43; Ye Gang, Lilshi Yewu Shoufei Zhidu Gaige Qianjian [A 
Humble Opinion on the Reform of the Lawyers Services Fee System], ZHONGGUO L'OsHl BAO 
[CHINA LAWYER NEWS], June I, 1996, at 3. 
lOS See Ma, supra note 99, at 76-77; Qing, supra note 101, at 43. At least one province has is-
sued regulations expressly permitting contingency fees. See Hainan Jingji Tequ Lushi Zhiye 
Tiaoli Banxing [Hainan SPecial Economic Zone Provisions on the Legal Profession are Promul-
gated], ZHONGGUO L'OSHl BAO [CHINA LAWYER NEWS], Aug. 10, 1996, at I. 
106 See, e.g., Gui & Xiong, supra note 86j Lin, supra note 55 (noting that the plaintiff spent 
more than 20,000 yuan for lawyers and evidence, and thus ran deeply into debt). 
107 See 1996 Academic Interview K. 
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yers appear to be increasingly interested in class actions,108 perhaps 
because they derive significant economic benefits from high profile 
cases regardless of the small fees the cases generate, as publicity from 
such cases may lead to future business for the attorneys.l09 
Lawyers' roles in class actions also determine their incentives to 
undertake such cases. Lawyers who are able to expand the size of the 
class, and thus the amount in controversy, will be more willing to as-
sume complex cases. However, it is unclear to what extent lawyers 
can legally encourage litigation or expand plaintiff groups. Some law-
yers have openly worked to expand the size of plaintiff classesjlIO in 
other cases, such as the Mao watch case, lawyers appear to have 
waited for the court to issue a notice to those whose rights were poten-
tially implicated in the action.111 
The divergence between theory and practice in legal fees reflects 
continuing ambivalence regarding the appropriate role of lawyers in 
China. China appears committed to making both courts and lawyers 
more accessible and to bringing increasing numbers of disputes into 
the formal legal system, but remains uncomfortable with providing the 
financial incentives required to encourage lawyers to undertake com-
plex cases. Thus, the development of class actions is important in part 
for the possibility that even if legal fees continue to be tightly regu-
lated, significant fmancial opportunities may exist where numerous 
claims are combined into one action.1l2 Such incentives may be par-
ticularly important in labor, environmental, and consumer cases, areas 
currently unattractive to many Chinese lawyers.lI3 
108 See 1996 Academic Interview S. 
109 See 1996 Journalist Interview Aj 1997 Academic Interview B. 
llO For example, after more than ten peasants contacted lawyers regarding a contract dispute, 
the lawyers not only wrote to 75 other potential plaintiffs whose names were listed on the dis-
puted contract, but also wrote an article in the local newspaper regarding the litigation. See 
Zhang & Wu, supra note 48; see also Yuan, supra note 38 (reporting that lawyers on a delayed 
flight organized the other passengers to sue the airline). 
III See Li & Zhong, supra note 40. 
ll2 Other factors, most notably the availability of large damage awards, may also increase a 
lawyer's willingness to assume difficult cases. The amount in controversy in economic and ad-
ministrative cases has continua\ly increased over the past decade. See YEARBOOK (1996), supra 
note 2, at 125, 127. In addition, courts have begun to award damages for emotional distress. See 
Guo Hengzhong, Haidian Fayuan Panjue Woguo Shouli Jingshen Peichang An: Huirong ShaoniJ 
Jia Guoyu Huopei 10 Wan Yuan [Haidian Court Rules in Our Nation's First Emotional Distress 
Damages Case: Young Girl with a Burnt Face Jia Guoyu Receives 100,000 Yilan], FAZHI RIBAO 
[LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Mar. 22, 1997, at 2. Moreover, although China in general does not per-
mit punitive damages, the Consumer Protection Law states that sellers of fake goods or services 
may be required to compensate consumers an amount equal to twice the price of the goods. See 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xiaofeizhe Quanyi Baohu Fa [people's RepUblic of China Law 
Regarding the Protection of Consumers' Rights and Interests], 1993 FAGUI HUIBIAN 156, art. 49. 
113 Lawyers comment that the complexity and unlikelihood of victory make such cases unat-
tractive. For example, a lawyer who litigated an environmental class action in Jiangsu com-
mented that the case not only pitted him against powerful economic interests, but also necessi-
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Class actions may also suggest a shifting role for lawyers as they 
are drawn to cases with potentially large social impacts. The in-
creased willingness of lawyers to challenge powerful local interests 
suggests that increased financial incentives may accelerate the devel-
opment of a more independent legal profession, as lawyers become in-
creasingly willing to undertake cases in which they clash with local 
governments. However, lawyers in such cases are not always at odds 
with the state: they may also be acting to force local governments or 
industries to obey national laws. Thus, even as China's lawyers move 
away from their roles as state legal workers, class actions suggest that 
lawyers may be assuming more active positions in the project of law 
implementation. 
The development of class actions has coincided with China's at-
tempts to increase access to legal advice through the construction of a 
legal aid system.1l4 Government discussion of legal aid to date has fo-
cused in part on the responsibility of the legal profession to provide as-
sistance to those who cannot afford lawyers. Lawyers in some cities 
are now required either to pay for legal aid programs or to handle a 
certain number of pro bono cases annually.llS The development of 
government-sponsored legal aid in China fits well with traditional 
views of lawyers as state agents, with the Lawyers Law's emphasis on 
lawyers continuing to be subject to significant regulation by the Minis-
try of Justice and other government bodies, and with the desire of the 
central government to bring disputes into the formal legal system. 
Legal aid in China has rarely involved class action litigation,116 but 
such cases may serve as important complements to its development. ll7 
tated teaching the local court basic concepts of environmental law. See 1996 Academic Interview 
K. 
114 As of July 1997, 48 Chinese provincial or local governments had established some form of a 
legal aid center. See Sifa Bu Falii Yuanzhu Zhongxin [Ministry of Justice Legal Aid Center], Gedi 
FaUl Yuanzhu Jigou Xunsu Jianli [Local Areas Rapidly Establish Legal Aid Organizations], FALtl" 
YUANZHU GONGZUO XIAOXI [NEWS OF WORK ON LEGAL AID], June 16, 1997, at 9, 10. For an 
overview of legal aid in China, see generally TANSUO You ZHONGGUO TESE DE FALO 
YUANZHU ZHIDU [EXPLORING A LEGAL AID SYSTEM WITH UNIQUE CHINESE 
CHARACTERISTICS] (Xiao Yang ed., 1996); and Benjamin L. Liebman, Legal Aid in China 
(March 16, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
115 See Sun Jibin, Shixiang Pinruouzhe De Nuoya Fangzhou-Zhongguo FaW Yuanzhu Zai 
Xingdong [The Noah's Ark that is Sailing to the Poor and Weak-China's Legal Aid in Action], in 
EXPLORING A LEGAL AID SYSTEM WITH UNIQUE CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS, supra note II4, 
at 99, 102-05. 
116 Interviews at four of China's leading legal aid centers in the summer of 1996 revealed that 
the centers had conducted a total of one class action. See 1996 Government Interview P; 1996 
Government Interview Q; 1996 Lawyer Interview B; 1996 Lawyer Interview H. 
117 It is too early to tell whether class actions will become a significant focus of China's legal 
aid providers. The development of class actions by legal aid providers will likely depend on the 
degree to which non-government legal aid providers are able to operate in China. Those lawyers 
interested in class actions thus far have been at university-based, non-government legal aid cen-
ters; government-funded legal aid centers have largely focused on individual civil and criminal 
cases. See Liebman, supra note 114, at 88-90. 
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Even a well-developed legal aid system will be able to provide assis-
tance to only a fraction of those in need of legal help. The develop-
ment of class action litigation in China suggests that, given appropri-
ate incentives, profit-seeking lawyers may be willing to take on many 
of the complex cases that otherwise would be brought without lawyers 
or would not be brought at all. 
More importantly, however, the development of class action litiga-
tion suggests that a market-driven legal profession may be essential 
not just to increasing access to China's courts, but also to the project 
of law implementation. Legal aid has developed in part because it is 
consistent with the central government's desire to harness the legal 
profession to force disputes into the legal system, and thus to increase 
compliance with national laws. Yet the continued strict regulation of 
legal fees reflects China's reluctance to recognize that increased finan-
cial incentives to lawyers may serve the same goals; indeed, legal aid is 
also a response to the perceived excesses of a newly market-driven le-
gal profession. The development of class actions suggests that China's 
ability to use the legal profession to increase law implementation may 
be contingent on a willingness to grant lawyers financial incentives, 
which in turn requires accepting a role for lawyers largely independent 
of local and national government control. 
Friction between the government's desire to use the newly market-
driven legal profession to further law reform and its desire to continue 
tight regulation of lawyers reflects a larger question: to what degree 
can China both direct disputes into and control the evolution of the 
formal legal system? The class actions described in Part II are largely 
consistent with the political values most likely to have been responsi-
ble for China's decision to permit class actions: the desires to steer dis-
putes into the formal legal system, to expedite redress for certain ex-
isting collective interests, and to facilitate certain policy goals. Yet 
China's experience with class actions also hints that class actions in 
China may serve to organize otherwise unconnected individuals. As 
lawyers increasingly seek plaintiffs, they may be organizing individuals 
who would not otherwise act in concert. It remains to be seen whether 
the creation of s!lch new collective interests will lead lawyers and 
plaintiff groups to pursue goals in tension with those of the state.118 
V. CONCLUSION 
Class actions in China differ from individual actions not only in the 
number of persons involved, but also in their results. Even unsuccess-
ful cases or unenforceable decisions may have beneficial results. Many 
118 Cj. Li & O'Brien, supra note 12, at 55 (noting that, although consistent with "the vocabulary 
of the regime," actions of villagers resisting local officials may create "new understandings, new 
commitments, and new aspirations,,). 
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press accounts of class actions have noted the role such cases play in 
raising the legal awareness of both the litigants and society.1l9 The 
filing of a suit may at times be sufficient to attract the interest of 
higher-level authorities,120 or simply to pressure local officials and 
courts. Such consequences are particularly important given the diffi-
culties courts face in enforcing judgments121 and the power local 
authorities often have over local COUrts.122 Class actions may also 
force judges and other authorities to confront cases and areas of law 
that might otherwise be ignored.123 Thus, although class actions are 
part of the general growth of litigation, they may also be more influen-
tial than other forms of litigation. Yet it is unclear whether the gov-
ernment intends such effects or whether they are, at least in part, an 
outgrowth of granting new incentives for raising collective grievances. 
Class actions also demonstrate that plaintiffs may increasingly be 
using law to pursue their own interests and to force government ac-
tion. Lawyers and litigants are doing this not only by bringing lawsuits, 
but also by combining lawsuits with petitioning of administrative organs 
and appeals to the press. Such strategies appear to be successful in 
part because they are consistent with state approaches to law imple-
mentation. Law in the People's Republic has never been a matter 
solely for the courts or the bureaucracy, and lawyers who pursue cases 
through the press or who file suit to pressure local authorities are tak-
ing advantage of the same mechanisms the government uses to dis-
seminate law. The ability of class action litigants to do this reflects a 
system in which the state's use of law to exert control and pursue spe-
cific policy goals may be best served by allowing lawyers and litigants 
increased bcentives and flexibility. The continued development of 
class action litigation may reflect not only the evolution of the state's 
approach toward law, but also that the ways in which litigants use the 
legal system to pursue their own interests may be increasingly impor-
tant in shaping the evolution of law in China. 
119 See, e.g., Huang & Xiao, supra note 51 (claiming that a class action increased understanding 
of environmental law); Yuan, supra note 38 (stating that the filing of a class action had an influ-
ence on people's understanding of law and on the quality of airline service). 
120 See, e.g., Wang, supra note 59 (describing intervention by the governor and the provincial 
environmental bureau, and the closing of a polluting factory, after 4853 villagers sued the local 
environmental bureau). 
121 See supra pp. 1533-35 (discussing implementation problems facing class actions); see also 
Lan, supra note 68, at 16 (questioning whether a court judgment would be ignored by the defen-
dant, a local government). 
122 For example, a lawyer who litigated an environmental class action stated that the case was 
resolved against the plaintiffs when the mayor intervened on behalf of the defendant industries. 
See 1996 Lawyer Interview H. 
123 Cf. 1996 Lawyer Interview H (describing as a success a court's willingness to hear an envi-
ronmental class action, and noting that the case was likely to increase awareness of environmental 
issues regardless of the outcome). 
